2284 hack event(s)
Description of the event: Solana-based proprietary AMM Aquifer was exploited for about $2.5 million. Public reporting points to compromised protocol-linked wallets or admin credentials rather than a confirmed smart-contract bug. The attacker operated addresses on both Solana and Ethereum. The same day, Aquifer’s Solana upgrade authority posted an on-chain white-hat offer: return at least 80% of stolen assets by September 3, 2026, 14:00 UTC to designated recovery addresses, and keep up to 20% as a bounty, in exchange for no civil claims by the project.
Amount of loss: $ 2,500,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Ankr’s ankrFLOW liquid staking contract to mint approximately 8.6 million unbacked ankrFLOW tokens, then used them as collateral with More Markets’ E-mode to drain about 15.5 million WFLOW (~$410,000 at spot) from the lending reserve. The attacker realized roughly $246,000 after slippage. The Flow Foundation stated the root cause was in Ankr’s Solidity contract, not Flow EVM or More Markets.
Amount of loss: $ 410,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: An attacker used a flash loan to execute large swaps on a Uniswap V3 pool and manipulate the spot price (slot0). This caused Float Protocol’s Hypervisor contracts to misprice LP shares. Because critical functions lacked TWAP/oracle validation and slippage protection, the attacker repeatedly deposited and withdrew at inflated share values, extracting about $28,000 (10.71 ETH).
Amount of loss: $ 28,000 Attack method: Flash Loan Price Manipulation
Description of the event: An attacker exploited a rounding/precision vulnerability in legacy Balancer V1 contracts. Using flash loans to compress WBTC reserves to near-zero, they minted a large amount of BPT with only 1 satoshi of WBTC and then proportionally exited to drain DPI, USDC, WETH and WBTC from the pool.
Amount of loss: $ 234,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On August 30, 2026, an attacker looped borrowing and re-supplying Tectonic’s governance token TONIC as collateral while manipulating its price by ~195x, then borrowed about $120.4 million from multiple Tectonic lending markets in one transaction. Cronos halted and rolled back the chain, restoring on-chain assets to the pre-exploit state; approximately $9.19 million that left Cronos before the halt remains unrecovered. Supply and borrow remain paused.
Amount of loss: $ 120,400,000 Attack method: Price Manipulation
Description of the event: An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Switchboard’s production code to add a controlled key to a live oracle, published false prices roughly 100 times below market, deposited into Full Sail vaults at distorted values, then restored prices and withdrew more than deposited.
Amount of loss: $ 91,000 Attack method: Oracle Manipulation
Description of the event: The Fogo Foundation experienced a compromise by an unknown actor, resulting in 400 million FOGO tokens being sent to a bad actor. The Foundation immediately alerted exchanges, law enforcement, and forensic experts. Initially stated no impact on the blockchain, but later halted the mainnet as a precaution to restrict associated addresses and prevent further asset movement. Mainnet was later restarted after recovering and permanently removing 237 million tokens.
Amount of loss: $ 3,000,000 Attack method: Private Key Compromised
Description of the event: Attackers exploited a vulnerability in an outdated version of Rain’s Solana card contract used by Avici (and a few other programs). By submitting crafted signature bundles to gain unauthorized admin rights via AddCollateralAdmin and then withdrawing collateral, they drained $500,859.22 from 1,685 users’ card balances. Self-custodial wallets were unaffected. The contract was upgraded across all programs, and full refunds were promised.
Amount of loss: $ 500,859.22 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: Base-based DeFi lending protocol Moonwell was attacked. The attacker inflated the price of the low-liquidity token MAMO, posted it as collateral, and borrowed real assets such as cbBTC and USDC from markets including mCBTC and mUSDC.
Amount of loss: $ 8,700,000 Attack method: Price Manipulation
Description of the event: CashCowCoin’s unverified trading router implementation contract had a flawed sell() flow. After the PancakeSwap Router completed the CCC→WBNB swap, the proxy called a privileged token function to transfer post-tax CCC from the Pair to the dead address and invoked Pair.sync(). This burned the sell-side CCC while permanently retaining the reduced WBNB reserve, enabling repeated draining of the pool’s WBNB through about 80 iterative sell cycles.
Amount of loss: $ 117,400 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: FH Token on the BSC chain was exploited in its FH/USDT liquidity pool on PancakeSwap V2. A flaw in the token’s _transfer function and isSell logic caused incorrect token burns during sells, allowing the attacker to drain funds from the pool through repeated buy-and-sell loops, resulting in a loss of approximately $20,000.
Amount of loss: $ 20,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: The BLND-USDC liquidity pool of CometDEX (Comet AMM) on the Stellar network was exploited due to an accounting bug that allowed same-asset swaps (USDC→USDC), corrupting reserve calculations. The attacker used flash loans from a Blend pool and repeated the process about 36 times to extract excess funds, resulting in a loss of approximately $717,518.92 USDC. Funds were subsequently moved.
Amount of loss: $ 717,518.92 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: Enjin’s legacy ERC-1155 Crypto Items platform on Ethereum was exploited. The attacker used a storage-layout mismatch in delegate-call adapters plus an unprotected initialize function to take over the Managed Delegate Proxy via DELEGATECALL. After gaining manager privileges, they registered a malicious adapter, transferred NFTs from about 52 wallets without approval, and melted them to redeem the backing ENJ from the reserve, draining approximately 5.24 million ENJ .
Amount of loss: $ 162,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On August 23, 2026, Term Finance’s Strategy Vaults (Ethereum-based fixed-rate lending protocol by Term Labs) suffered a governance exploit. The attacker acquired majority voting power (100% on several USDC vaults, ~91% on the ETH Meta Vault), passed malicious proposals to disable the timelock and drain ~2,843 ETH and 1.68M USDC (later swapped to DAI), resulting in ~$8.5 million losses (about 68% of the vaults’ then-TVL).
Amount of loss: $ 8,500,000 Attack method: Governance Attack
Description of the event: On August 23, 2026, the Arrakis V1 / G-UNI ENS–WETH liquidity-manager vault (0x7c687f775a3b73bbab0e15832f24caab5d53bdde) was drained via Uniswap V3 spot-price manipulation. The attacker flash-loaned 1,800 WETH from Morpho Blue, skewed the pool’s instantaneous spot price, minted vault shares at the distorted valuation, restored the price, and burned the shares for a richer token mix, netting ≈2.94 WETH. Root cause: mint()/burn() valued the Uniswap V3 position off pool.slot0() with no TWAP or deviation guard (TWAP only protected rebalance()).
Amount of loss: $ 7,018 Attack method: Flashloan Price Manipulation
Description of the event: The ERC-20 bridge of warp.green (a cross-chain messaging protocol between Chia and EVM chains) suffered an exploit due to a vulnerability in the Chia-side Chialisp puzzle. The attacker minted worthless CAT tokens, presented them as burned wUSDC, obtained validator signatures, and drained ~$93,000 USDC from the Base and Ethereum bridge contracts, later converting the funds to ETH. The CAT bridge (securing assets like wXCH) appears unaffected.
Amount of loss: $ 93,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: Layer 1 blockchain TAC was exploited when an attacker used a vulnerability in the shared Cosmos EVM precompile layer to drain approximately 2.985 billion TAC tokens (valued at around $7.5 million) from a single account. The project confirmed it was a drain (not a mint), total supply unchanged, only $TAC affected, and the flaw is not in TAC-specific code. The chain was halted at block 24,671,475; the team is coordinating with SEAL 911 and exchanges to track funds and plans to release a post-mortem and relaunch plan.
Amount of loss: $ 7,500,000 Attack method: Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: An attacker exploited vulnerabilities in the shared Cosmos EVM module (an arithmetic underflow in the staking precompile’s balance write-back after delegation, combined with vesting account handling and other undisclosed bugs). By creating a vesting account and deploying a contract to it, the attacker repeated the technique 18 times, draining approximately 148.3 million KII from various wallets. KiiChain halted the network at block 9355723 to stop further theft.
Amount of loss: $ 9,700,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: The Sandbox’s SAND cross-chain bridge (LayerZero OFT on Base and BNB Chain) was exploited. The attacker used a configuration function to gain sole verifier rights, minting large amounts of unbacked SAND and draining approximately 14.74 million real SAND (~$675,000) from the Ethereum vault. The project quickly halted affected bridging; Ethereum and Polygon assets remained unaffected.
Amount of loss: $ 675,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: An attacker exploited an unsigned integer underflow vulnerability in the upstream Cosmos EVM module to unauthorizedly transfer approximately 720.9 million MANTRA from two MANTRA-managed addresses (the burn address and a dormant genesis-era multisig). The chain was halted to contain the threat and later resumed after a v8.4.0 patch. No validator keys, admin privileges, or user funds were compromised.
Amount of loss: $ 3,600,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability