2379 hack event(s)
Description of the event: On November 18, 2026, Gonka AI’s Ethereum cross-chain bridge was attacked. The attacker rotated the bridge’s epoch BLS group key, drained the remaining stablecoin reserves (approx. $884,800 in USDT/USDC), and minted large amounts of unbacked WGNK. Approximately $1.05 million was extracted across about 5 transactions, with the attack ongoing at the time of initial alerts. The network’s consensus was unaffected.
Amount of loss: $ 1,050,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 18, 2026, K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault (a yield-bearing ERC-4626 vault built on Liquity V2 Stability Pools) was exploited. Attackers used flash-loaned wstETH to self-liquidate Liquity V2 troves, manipulated the vault’s share accounting (flaw in totalAssets calculation), minted cheap sBOLD shares, swapped collateral, and redeemed other depositors’ BOLD, draining approximately $3.43 million. The team paused the contracts and is investigating.
Amount of loss: $ 3,430,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 18, 2026, Peapods Finance’s deployer private key was apparently compromised. The attacker used it to set a minter on L2 PEAS contracts, mint tokens, bridge them to Ethereum mainnet, and sell them, creating sell pressure. The team quickly withdrew 98-99% of L2 liquidity to limit further extraction and is working on a post-mortem and fund recovery. PEAS cannot be minted on mainnet—only previously bridged tokens could be extracted.
Amount of loss: - Attack method: Private Key Leakage
Description of the event: On November 18, 2026, RNT Lend (Reental’s Aave V3 white-label lending market on Polygon) was drained. An authorized admin key was used to upgrade the USDT0 and USDC proxy contracts to malicious code that allowed unrestricted withdrawals. Approximately $954,703–$955,000 in stablecoins was extracted ($454,825 by two MEV bots that front-ran the keyholder, and ~$500,000 by the keyholder who bridged the funds out). About $49.34 million in property tokens were also taken but fully clawed back by Reental within roughly two hours. Stablecoin liquidity was emptied and withdrawals froze.
Amount of loss: $ 954,703 Attack method: Admin Key Compromise
Description of the event: Self-custodial Bitcoin Cash (BCH) wallet Paytaca suffered backend vulnerability exploits on November 17–18, 2026. Attackers used flaws in its P2P Ramp and other backend systems to generate fraudulent orders and unsolicited payment requests. The team stated the attacks targeted backend infrastructure only; private keys remain solely on users’ devices and are never stored on servers, so fund transfers still require user signatures. User funds and private keys were unaffected. The team is investigating/fixing the issues and advises users to ignore suspicious orders/requests and never sign transactions they did not initiate.
Amount of loss: 0 Attack method: Backend Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 17, 2026, the B18TimeBank protocol on Base was exploited. An attacker redeemed signed level-reward vouchers and withdrew approximately 404,540 USDC from the settlement contract in a single transaction. On-chain records confirm the transfer. A later check showed about 106,785 USDC remaining in the settlement contract, but containment remains unconfirmed.
Amount of loss: $ 404,540 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: Overnight from November 17 to 18, 2026, an attacker exploited a backend vulnerability in LUKSO’s email-based recovery system, gained control of the service’s recovery profiles/configurations, added their own controller keys to about 300 users’ Universal Profiles (smart contract accounts), and stole approximately 1.4 million LYX. LUKSO has shut down the service, stating that the blockchain, protocols, and smart contracts were unaffected, and no private keys or recovery phrases were leaked. Attacker-installed keys can still move remaining assets, so holders must remove them. A compensation plan is being developed.
Amount of loss: $ 95,000 Attack method: Backend Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 16, 2026, Lighter (a perpetual futures DEX on an Ethereum ZK rollup) suffered an incident due to a leaked trader API key (caused by unsafe non-official SDK signing code that reused nonces, allowing private key recovery from public signatures). The attacker used the keys to create public pools and drain funds, with ~$10.39M USDC withdrawn (estimates up to ~$15.5M). Protocol and smart contracts were unaffected; the team paused withdrawals, enabled Guardian mode, recovered ~$5M, and resumed operations.
Amount of loss: $ 10,393,057 Attack method: API key leakage
Description of the event: MORE Markets, a lending protocol deployed on Flow EVM, was exploited due to a bug in its lending contract liquidation logic. An attacker used flash loans to open and self-liquidate positions in the ankrFLOW/WFLOW market. A flaw cleared the collateral without clearing the corresponding WFLOW debt, allowing withdrawals from the WFLOW reserve. Losses were approximately $308,000; the protocol has been paused, with impact limited to users who supplied WFLOW to that market.
Amount of loss: $ 308000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 15, 2026, Chain Games’ older CHAIN delegation staking contracts on Polygon were exploited. Attackers abused a logic and access-control flaw in the unstakeClaimTokens share accounting, allowing them to drain the staking escrow via claim() calls without holding legitimate unbonded shares. Approximately 37.98 million CHAIN (worth about $20,000) was taken. The team disabled delegation the same day and committed to making all affected stakers, delegators, and validators whole.
Amount of loss: $ 20,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 14–15, 2026, Bitcoin mining services provider Luxor experienced an unauthorized redirect of hashrate through its Commander fleet-management software. Attackers temporarily pointed machines from just over a dozen client accounts to another pool (e.g., OCEAN). The incident was limited in scope, with no data leaked. Luxor patched Commander within about two hours, restored settings, and pledged full compensation to affected clients for the redirected hashrate. The CEO described it as involving a sophisticated AI-enabled vector. Other Luxor services (Pool, LuxOS) were unaffected.
Amount of loss: $ 10,500 Attack method: Software Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 14, 2026, HARD Lend, a decentralized lending application on Kava Chain, was exploited. The attacker used a lending-accounting vulnerability to inflate the value of BUSD collateral in a dormant market by roughly 243,000 times, then repeatedly borrowed and liquidated positions to drain approximately 53.9 million KAVA from the lending pool. The incident was confined to HARD Lend; Kava Chain’s underlying security was not compromised and no new tokens were minted. The exploit has been blocked, some funds frozen, and the team is accelerating the permanent shutdown of lending functionality.
Amount of loss: $ 3,760,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 14, 2026, HyprEarn disclosed reports of unauthorized trading activity on a small number of Hyperliquid accounts that had previously authorized its API agent wallets. The team revoked all old agents on their side and instructed users to remove the approvals and re-enable trading with new ones. Agent wallets can only place trades and cannot withdraw or transfer funds. The root cause, number of affected accounts, and any financial losses remain undisclosed.
Amount of loss: - Attack method: Unknown
Description of the event: On November 13, 2026, DeFi project Pool Party had 15 pools drained (12 on Arbitrum and 3 on Base) due to a vulnerability in the snapshot contracts that record user positions. The attacker modified their recorded position, deposited only 10 USDC, and withdrew all funds from the pools, resulting in approximately $215k in losses. Pools on Polygon and Robinhood Chain were unaffected, and the vulnerability has been fixed across all chains.
Amount of loss: $ 215,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 12, 2026, Edel Finance announced that approximately $300,000 worth of $EDEL tokens were stolen and sold on the market. The team is working with authorities and exchanges to investigate and block the funds, with some tokens successfully blocked by exchanges. A more detailed post-mortem is forthcoming.
Amount of loss: $ 300,000 Attack method: Unknown
Description of the event: On November 12, 2026, MapleStory Universe confirmed unauthorized external access to part of its off-chain server infrastructure, exposing some user data (wallet addresses, nicknames, login history, partial emails, linked social accounts, etc.) and information from 328 Builder apps; the blockchain and smart contracts were unaffected, with no assets stolen. The team blocked the access path, replaced servers, and plans to rotate operational keys.
Amount of loss: 0 Attack method: Server Intrusion
Description of the event: PennysiaSettlement (Ethereum) was exploited via an arbitrary external call vulnerability in executeSwap. The attacker deployed fake tokens to bypass spend checks and used residual user approvals to drain approximately $5,131 in assets from 4 users via transferFrom calls through the settlement contract.
Amount of loss: $ 5,131 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: On November 12, 2026, the server of Coinone’s outsourced customer support provider (MetaM) was illegally accessed by external attackers, resulting in the potential leak of personal information from users who had contacted the customer center. Exposed data may include names, phone numbers, emails, dates of birth, bank account numbers, passwords, resident registration numbers, ID issue dates, home addresses, wallet addresses, and TXIDs (varying by individual). Coinone’s core membership, trading, and wallet systems remain unaffected. The exchange blocked related IPs, reported the incident to authorities, and is investigating with the contractor.
Amount of loss: 0 Attack method: Supply Chain Attack
Description of the event: The Initia L1 was halted at 06:18 UTC on November 10, 2026, in coordination with validators after identifying unauthorized transfers from escrow accounts holding assets bridged to several rollups. Compromised rollup infrastructure keys allowed the attacker to fabricate IBC transfers; approximately $605,000 USDC left via Noble along with ~$10k in other tokens. Most remaining assets stayed on the halted L1.
Amount of loss: $ 615,000 Attack method: Private Key Leak
Description of the event: On November 10, 2026, Across Protocol’s domain registrar Namecheap was hit by a social engineering attack, allowing an attacker to take control of the across.to domain and set up a phishing site. The team was alerted within ~15 minutes and took the site down; SEAL911 and Cloudflare helped flag it as phishing and pull DNS records. Some users who visited and connected wallets/signed approvals during the brief window may have been affected (not a smart-contract exploit). The project pledged to make all affected users whole and advised revoking permissions. Third-party integrations and API users were unaffected.
Amount of loss: - Attack method: Social Engineering