2120 hack event(s)
Description of the event: The LegendaryMoneyMonNft contract’s cliamRewred function had a signature verification flaw. The verify() only checked if recoverSigner(...) == admin, without properly validating cases where ecrecover returns address(0). The attacker set admin to zero address, then used an invalid signature (r=0, s=0, v=27) to bypass checks, arbitrarily claim rewards, drain all tokens from the contract, and swap them for USDT via PancakeSwap.
Amount of loss: $ 85,519.47 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: The Joe Agent ($JOE) project smart contract had a single-function reentrancy vulnerability. The attacker exploited the logic in _removeLiquidityViaContract where BNB was sent via low-level call before updating lpInfo[user].lpAmount, performing ~25 reentrancy loops to steal 62.5 BNB and ~1.196M JOE.
Amount of loss: $ 45,000 Attack method: Reentrancy Attack
Description of the event: Legacy liquidity locker contracts of DxSale (a veteran DeFi launchpad on BNB Chain) were exploited, draining approximately $7.3 million from over 1,400 old LPs locked since 2021. The attacker used owner privileges via a custom drainer to set near-zero fees, backdate unlock times to 1970, and withdraw funds; on-chain links suggest possible team connections, with the platform remaining silent.
Amount of loss: $ 7,300,000 Attack method: Ownership Override Attack
Description of the event: The ONTR token project was drained due to a flawed onlyOwner check in the contract (accepts owner == address(0)). This allowed re-owning a renounced token. The attacker used hidden balance-grant logic to fake massive ONTR balances (no totalSupply/mint logs), dumped into the ONTR/WETH LP, and swapped out WETH for profit.
Amount of loss: $ 98,200 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: The DeFi protocol Stake DAO was exploited on the Arbitrum network due to a compromised deployer private key. The attacker used the privileged access to alter the setPeer() configuration for the LayerZero v2 bridge, redirecting trust to a contract they controlled. They then forged a cross-chain message, triggering the unlimited minting of approximately 5.4 trillion vsdCRV tokens. Subsequently, the attacker swapped about 16.83 million vsdCRV for ~43.78 ETH, profiting an estimated $91,170, and bridged the funds to Ethereum mainnet.
Amount of loss: $ 91,170 Attack method: Private Key Leakage
Description of the event: On May 27, 2026, Superfortune ($GUA) experienced a security incident. The team intended to transfer additionally unlocked tokens to the airdrop claim contract address. However, during the multisig transaction execution, the recipient address was altered, resulting in approximately 14.98 million GUA (worth about $15.18 million at the time) being sent to a suspected hacker-controlled address. The attacker subsequently dumped all the tokens on-chain for roughly 2,784 ETH (approximately $5.66 million at the time) and distributed the funds across multiple wallets. The incident caused GUA's price to plummet by 70-76%. Official preliminary investigation points to address tampering in a multisignature transaction. Although initially described as a "suspected address poisoning attack," the possibility is considered low due to no prior interaction between the hacker address and any Superfortune-related addresses. The team is continuing its investigation and will provide further updates.
Amount of loss: $ 15180000 Attack method: Multisig Address Tampering
Description of the event: On BSC, the SKP token suffered a token-side LP balance drain + sync attack. The attacker profited approximately $212.85k in a single transaction (162,854.21 USDT + 75.88 BNB). The root cause was a flaw in SKP token logic that allowed extra SKP tokens to be transferred out from the Pancake V2 SKP/USDT LP after a large buy, followed by calling sync() to write incorrect reserves, pushing the SKP reserve close to zero. The attacker used flash loans to amplify the attack.
Amount of loss: $ 212,850 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: WUSD.fi / GLOVE on Ethereum suffered an incentive abuse exploit. The attacker exploited the lack of Sybil resistance in the WUSD._englove reward path. By using EIP-7702 helper contracts and a Morpho USDT flash loan to repeatedly wrap/unwrap at least 100 WUSD (with fresh addresses holding <2 GLOVE), they harvested nearly 2 GLOVE per cycle, dumped the GLOVE into Uniswap V3 pools, and drained ~$200K in USDC/USDT from the liquidity pools.
Amount of loss: $ 200,000 Attack method: Sybil Attack
Description of the event: A third-party Gnosis Safe module named SquidRouterModule was exploited, draining approximately $3-3.2 million from 86 Gnosis Safe wallets on Ethereum and Base within about 2 hours. The module has no affiliation with the official Squid Router protocol—confusion arose solely due to the contract name on Basescan. Victims had previously added this faulty third-party module as a trusted Safe Module, granting it permission to spend any tokens without signatures. The attacker exploited weak authentication (accepting a publicly visible constant string as "message security" proof) to execute arbitrary calldata, forcing fake Uniswap V3 swaps (real tokens for worthless 'u' token in attacker-controlled pools) and draining funds, which were consolidated into ~3.07M DAI. Squid confirmed its core router and user funds/integrations remain fully secure.
Amount of loss: $ 3,200,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: According to on-chain investigator ZachXBT and security firm Blockaid, two contracts linked to European stablecoin issuer StablR (EURR and USDR on Ethereum) were suspected of being exploited. The attacker’s funds appear to have come via CCTP on Noble. ~$2.8M+ extracted so far, causing both stablecoins to depeg significantly.
Amount of loss: $ 2,800,000 Attack method: Private Key Leakage
Description of the event: Mure’s MureDistribution proxy contract on Ethereum was exploited due to an access control vulnerability in signature validation. The attacker supplied a malicious contract as the “signer source,” causing SignatureChecker to return true and bypass verification. This allowed draining 4.85M QUEST tokens (pre-approved to the proxy) via transferFrom, which were then swapped for ~5.45 ETH (~$11,700) on Uniswap. No user funds or main payment infrastructure were affected; it was a targeted logic flaw in one distribution contract.
Amount of loss: $ 11,700 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: Polymarket suffered an internal private key compromise incident. A six-year-old operational wallet private key (used for the rewards payout system and market initializer) was compromised, resulting in the extraction of approximately $573,200 (in USDC and POL) from addresses on the Polygon chain. Polymarket officials quickly clarified that this was not due to any smart contract or UMA CTF Adapter vulnerability; user funds, market resolutions, and the platform’s core functions remain fully secure. The team immediately rotated the private key, revoked permissions, and collaborated to freeze approximately $164,000 in funds, resulting in a net loss of about $409,200. The incident was first publicly flagged by on-chain investigator ZachXBT, and the platform continues to operate normally.
Amount of loss: $ 573,200 Attack method: Private Key Leakage
Description of the event: Fractal Protocol’s USDF vault on Arbitrum was exploited via a smart contract logic flaw. The attacker used an Aave V3 USDC.e flash loan, looped through Balancer V2 batchSwap callbacks, and recursively called the vault’s deposit (0xb6b55f25) and withdraw functions. This exploited the fixed daily-accrued tokenPrice (~1.27 USDC/USDF) and share-rounding accounting issues without proper invariant checks across re-entrant flows, allowing the extraction of approximately 13,700 USDC.e. The vault’s liquid USDC buffer dropped from around 14,778 USDC to near zero. Pre-hack TVL was approximately 97,270 USD.
Amount of loss: $ 13,700 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: The Butter Bridge V3.1 (part of MAP Protocol and Butter Network) was exploited. An attacker used a vulnerability in the OmniServiceProxy contract’s retry message verification logic, specifically an abi.encodePacked hash collision with dynamic-bytes fields. This allowed forging a cross-chain retry message that bypassed authentication, resulting in the minting of approximately 1 quadrillion (10^15) MAPO tokens (about 4.8 million times the legitimate ~208 million circulating supply). The attacker dumped ~1 billion fake MAPO into the Uniswap V4 ETH/MAPO pool, extracting roughly $180,000 in liquidity (≈52.21 ETH). The teams immediately paused the bridge and related swaps. User funds in pending swaps are safe, and a patch/audit/redeployment is in progress. The remaining ~999 trillion fake tokens stay in the attacker’s wallet, posing ongoing dilution risk.
Amount of loss: $ 180,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: RetoSwap (a Tor-based P2P multisig DEX powered by the Haveno trade protocol for trading Monero) was actively exploited. Attackers sent fake, out-of-order ACK messages impersonating the arbitrator during ongoing trades. This tricked the client into updating the arbitrator’s node address to the attacker’s controlled address, allowing them to create a compromised multisig wallet before the victim deposited funds. The exploit mainly affected crypto-to-crypto trades. RetoSwap immediately banned the attacker’s onion address, forced a client version update to halt all trading, and is working on a patch and potential recovery for affected users. Approximately 7,000 XMR were stolen.
Amount of loss: $ 2,700,000 Attack method: Protocol Logic Vulnerability
Description of the event: Veil Cash's legacy fixed-denomination privacy pools on Base were exploited due to a misconfigured Groth16 verifier (delta2 == gamma2), allowing the attacker to forge zkSNARK proofs and drain ~2.9 ETH. With whitehat intervention and the exploiter voluntarily returning funds, 100% of the affected funds were recovered. Live pools were unaffected.
Amount of loss: $ 5,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: The AI-powered crypto trading agent platform Bankr on the Base network suffered a social engineering attack. The attacker exploited prompt injection techniques targeting the automated agent trust layer between Grok and Bankrbot — including malicious inputs such as Morse code — to trick the system into executing unauthorized transaction signatures, ultimately gaining access to 14 user wallets and transferring funds. Bankr has suspended the affected functionality, launched an investigation, and pledged to fully reimburse all losses from its treasury.
Amount of loss: $ 440,000 Attack method: Social Engineering
Description of the event: HermesVault, an Algorand-based privacy protocol using zero-knowledge proofs for private transactions, was exploited. The attacker exploited a flaw in the key reset defense logic within the withdrawal verification script. This allowed bypassing the zero-knowledge (zk) verification process and unauthorized withdrawal of funds. The protocol permanently shut down operations following the incident. Lead engineer Giulio Pizzini confirmed that the core zk circuit remained secure, but the auxiliary withdrawal script had a vulnerability. The team patched the issue, refunded a large portion of the funds, and initiated a full refund process for affected users.
Amount of loss: $ 29,466 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: Blockaid detected an ongoing exploit on the Verus-Ethereum Bridge. The attacker drained approximately $11.58 million in assets (including ~1,625 ETH, ~103.6 tBTC, and ~147k USDC). The funds were swapped and consolidated into a drainer wallet (e.g., 0x65Cb8b128Bf6e690761044CCECA422bb239C25F9). This is a cross-chain bridge incident affecting the bridge infrastructure, not the core Verus blockchain. The project had recently issued an urgent update, but the exploit still occurred. Funds remain in the attacker's control as of the latest reports. On May 22, PeckShield's monitoring revealed that the exploiter of the Verus cross-chain bridge has returned 4,052.4 ETH (valued at around $8.5 million) to the team's designated address. This recovery accounts for 75% of the total plundered funds, while the remaining 25% (approximately 1,350 ETH) is being retained in the hacker's wallet as a bug bounty.
Amount of loss: $ 11,580,000 Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability
Description of the event: Echo Protocol’s eBTC on Monad was compromised due to an admin private key leak. The attacker granted themselves minting rights, minted 1,000 unbacked eBTC (~$76.7M nominal value), deposited 45 eBTC (~$3.45M) as collateral into Curvance to borrow ~11.29 WBTC (~$867K), bridged it to Ethereum, swapped for ETH, and sent ~384 ETH (~$821K) to Tornado Cash. The remaining 955 eBTC stays under attacker control, posing ongoing depegging risk.
Amount of loss: $ 821,700 Attack method: Private Key Leakage